Non la vedo esattamente così ; la rotta è pubblicata con quella quota massima ma siamo in uni spazio aereo di classe B. È fornito il servizio di controllo del traffico aereo e la separazione tra IFR o VFR. La cartina in sé non dice niente. Bisognerebbe sapere se sulle istruzioni locali della posizione atc sono previste delle separazioni tra le rotte (cioè mi viene scritto che il tale tratto di rotta a 200ft nax è separato dall'avvicinamento per pista 33 o 01). Mi sembra improbabile che esista una cosa del genere, tanto è vero che è stata applicata una separazione a vista, su richiesta del pilota. Separarsi a vista non avrebbe implicato volare a 200' sulla rotta contando su una improbabile e aleatoria sep verticale ma manovrare per avere una adeguata separazione laterale (come poi suggerito in extremis dal controllore: pass behind...).Grazie della mappa.
Comunque, stiamo parlando di una separazione minima garantita da procedura pari a 100 piedi, cioè più o meno 30 metri.
Quindi, due velivoli erano autorizzati ad incrociarsi, con velocità relativa di 3-400km/h, volando a vista, a soli 30 metri di separazione!
Fondamentalmente è stato un incidente che aspettava solo di accadere...
On Feb 14th 2025 the NTSB reported the Blackhawk was doing a checkride (the instructor was pilot monitoring), the crew was likely wearing night vision goggles, there is no evidence on the cockpit voice recorder they were not wearing googles. There are no defined boundaries on the helicopter routes despite the blue lines on the then charts. The helicopter was following helicopter route 1, the pilot indicated they were at 300 feet while the instructor said they were at 400 feet - that discrepancy is subject of review. When crossing over the Memorial Bridge the instructor told they were at 300 feet and needed to descend, the pilot replies they were descending. The portion of tower advising the helicopter crew that the CRJ was circling towards runway 33 was not audible on the Blackhawk's crew. 32 seconds before impact the helicopter passed the southern tip of Hains point. 20 seconds prior to impact tower queried the crew whether they had the CRJ in sight, a conflict alert was audible in the background of that transmission. The CRJ crew received an automatic advisory "Traffic! Traffic!" on their TCAS system. 17 seconds before impact tower directed the Blackhawk to pass behind the CRJ. The CVR of the Blackhawk did not have the first portion of the transmission to pass behind, because the helicopter crew were keying their microphone to talk to ATC. The Blackhawk crew reported the traffic in sight and requested visual separation, which was approved. The instructed thought ATC wanted them to turn left towards the east bank of the Potomac. 7 seconds before impact the CRJ rolled out for final on runway 33 at 344 feet. 1 seconds prior to impact the CRH increased pitch reaching 9 degrees nose up with elevators deflected near their maximum nose up range, the aircraft was at 313 feet. The radio altitude of the Blackhawk was at 278 feet at the time of the collision and had been steady for 5 seconds. The radio altitude 278 feet may not be what the crew saw on their barometric altimeters. The NTSB is confident that the helicopter was 278 feet above the Potomac river. The FDR did not record the barometric altitude indicated to the pilots. The altimeter setting was not recorded by the FDR, the FDR also did not record GPS data. The NTSB is facing challenges to determine what altitude was shown to the pilots on the primary flight instruments. Both helicopter and CRJ were on VHF frequencies though different frequencies. The helicopter was capable of transmitting ADS-B Out, however, did not transmit these data out, it is currently not known whether the ADS-B was turned off.
I sistemi TCAS non lavorano solo dialogando tra di loro, ma possono processare anche dati ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast).This can happen if an ADSB system on the ground is not filtering “ownship” traffic properly. Had this happen near KCOS airport (Colorado Springs) a year ago. The consistency tells me it is the same thing. If you understand how this system works, it is clear what happens when filtering from the ground stations are not done properly. On board equipment interprets your ship as a separate target, unknown, and right on top of you.
Dopo Capitan America è arrivato Capitan Ovvio?
NTSB issues "urgent safety recommendations," saying helicopter routes near DC-area airport pose safety risk. Helicopters should be barred from a four-mile stretch over the Potomac River when flights are landing on Reagan National Airport’s Runway 33, ...
67 vittime “ringraziano” per il “tempestivo” intervento…Aggiornamento da flighradar24: le route 4 e route 6 degli elicotteri vengono eliminate
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